ernist anthropologists claim that the aim of experimentation with such forms as intertextuality, dialogue, and self-referentiality is to demystify the anthropologist's unitary authority and thus to include, and structure the relationships among, the "many voices clamoring for expression"7 in the ethnographic situation. However, these new ways of structuring are more subtle and enigmatic than traditional modes of anthropological writing: they may serve to make the new ethnographies more obscure and, thus, difficult for anyone but highly trained specialists to dispute.
The essays in James Clifford and George Marcus's Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography are concerned with the explication of the relation between the ethnographic field situation and the style of the ethnographic text. In his introduction to the book, for example, Clifford explains the effects of the new ethnographers' use of dialogue: "It locates cultural interpretations in many sorts of reciprocal contexts, and it obliges writers to find diverse ways of rendering negotiated realities as multisubjective, power-laden, and incongruent. In this view, 'culture' is always relational, an inscription of communicative processes that exist, historically, between subjects in relation to power."8 Thus, Clifford argues that new ethnographers, those anthropologists who do not just theorize about textual production but who write cultural accounts, employ experimental writing techniques in an attempt to expose the power relations embedded in any ethnographic work and to produce a text that is less encumbered with Western assumptions and categories than traditional ethnographies have been. Michelle Rosaldo, for example, has attempted to make the initial cultural unintelligibility of the voice of an Ilongot headhunter persuasive not so much through argumentation or explication as through repetition.9 In Nisa: The Life and Words of a !Kung Woman, Marjorie Shostak juxtaposes the voice of the "other" with the voice of the ethnographer to offer the reader the possibility of confronting the difference between two distinct modes of understanding.'? In Moroccan Dialogues, Kevin Dwyer experiments with a dialogic mode of representation to emphasize that the ethnographic text is a collaborative endeavor between himself and Ethnographic Allegory," in Clifford and Marcus, eds., 98-121, esp. 117; and Paul Stoller, "A Dialogue on Anthropology between a Songhay and an Inquirer" (paper presented at the eighty-seventh annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Phoenix, Ariz., November 16-20, 1988). 7 Clifford, "Introduction," 15. However, what appear to be new and exciting insights to these new postmodernist anthropologists-that culture is composed of seriously contested codes of meaning, that language and politics are inseparable, and that constructing the "other" entails relations of domination'3-are insights that have received repeated and rich exploration in feminist theory for the past forty years. Discussion of the female as "other" was the starting point of contemporary feminist theory. As early as 1949, Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex argued that it was by constructing the woman as "other" that men in Western culture have constituted themselves as subjects.14 An early goal of this second wave of feminism was to recover women's experience and thereby to find ways that we as women could constitute ourselves-claim ourselves-as subjects. This early feminist theory does have similarities with traditional anthropology. Both were concerned with the relationship of the dominant and the "other," and with the need to expand and question definitions of the human. However, even in this early stage, a crucial difference existed between anthropological and feminist inquiries. While anthropology questioned the status of the participant-observer, it spoke from the position of the dominant and thus for the "other." Feminists speak from the position of the "other." This is not to oversimplify. It was not possible for feminists to speak directly as "other." Women in consciousness-raising groups were not simply giving voice to already formulated but not yet articulated women's perspectives; they were creatively constructing them. In telling stories about their experiences, they were n Dwyer (n. 1 above).
12 Friedrich (n. 1 above). 13 Clifford, "Introduction," 2. 14 
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giving them new meanings, meanings other than those granted by patriarchy, which sees women only as seductresses or wives, as good or bad mothers. Similarly, feminist scholars sought to construct new theoretical interpretations of women. Yet, even when attempting to speak for women, and as women, feminist scholars wrote within a patriarchal discourse that does not accord subject status to the feminine. In this way feminists exposed the contradictions in a supposedly neutral and objective discourse that always proceeds from a gendered being and thereby questioned the adequacy of academic discourse. Thus, feminist theory, even in the 1970s, was concerned not simply with understanding women's experience of otherness but also with the inscription of women as "other" in language and discourse. This was particularly evident in feminist literary criticism, which moved from the cataloging of stereotypes'5 to the study of female authorship as resistance and reinscription.'6 French feminists, notably Helene Cixous and Luce Irigaray, playfully exploited language's metaphoric and polysemic capacities to give voice to feminist reinterpretations of dominant myths about women."7 A fundamental goal of the new ethnography is similar: to apprehend and inscribe "others" in such a way as not to deny or diffuse their claims to subjecthood. As Marcus and Fischer put it, the new ethnography seeks to allow "the adequate representation of other voices or points of view across cultural boundaries."18 Informed by the notion of culture as a collective and historically contingent construct, the new ethnography claims to be acutely sensitive to cultural differences and, within cultures, to the multiplicity of individual experience.
However, despite these similarities, when anthropologists look for a theory on which to ground the new ethnography, they turn to postmodernism, dismissing feminist theory as having little to teach ety by questioning the basis of the truths that they are losing the privilege to define. Political scientist Nancy Hartsock has made a similar observation; she finds it curious that the postmodern claim that verbal constructs do not correspond in a direct way to reality has arisen precisely when women and non-Western peoples have begun to speak for themselves and, indeed, to speak about global systems of power differentials.28 In fact, Hartsock suggests that the postmodern view that truth and knowledge are contingent and multiple may be seen to act as a truth claim itself, a claim that undermines the ontological status of the subject at the very time when women and non-Western peoples have begun to claim themselves as subject. In a similar vein, Sarah Lennox has asserted that the postmodern despair associated with the recognition that truth is never entirely knowable is merely an inversion of Western arrogance.29 When Western white males-who traditionally have controlled the production of knowledge-can no longer define the truth, she argues, their response is to conclude that there is not a truth to be discovered. Similarly, Sandra Harding claims that "historically, relativism appears as an intellectual possibility, and as a 'problem,' only for dominating groups at the point where the hegemony (the universality) of their views is being challenged. recent years experienced a decentering as world politics and economic realities shift global power relations, postmodern theorizing can be understood as socially constructed itself, as a metaphor for the sense of the dominant that the ground has begun to shift under their feet. And this social construction, according to Hartsock, Lennox, Harding, and Huyssen, is one that potentially may work to preserve the privileged position of Western white males. If so, then the new ethnography, in its reliance on postmodernism, may run the risk of participating in an ideology blind to its own politics. More than that, it may help to preserve the dominant colonial and neocolonial relations from which anthropology, and especially the new ethnography, has been trying to extricate itself.
But to phrase this argument exclusively in these terms is to obscure the fact that the significant power relations for many of these new postmodernist anthropologists are not global but parochial, those that are played out in the halls of anthropology departments, those that are embedded in the patriarchal social order of the academy in which male and female scholars maneuver for status, tenure, and power. In a recent article in Current Anthropology, P. Steven Sangren argues that although postmodernist anthropologists call for a questioning of textually constituted authority, their efforts are actually a play for socially constituted authority and power.32 He thus suggests that it is first and foremost academic politics that condition the production and reproduction of ethnographic texts. Moreover, according to him, "whatever 'authority' is created in a text has its most direct social effect not in the world of political and economic domination of the Third World by colonial and neocolonial powers, but rather in the academic institutions in which such authors participate."33 While postmodernist anthropologists such as Clifford, Marcus, and Fischer may choose to think that they are transforming global power relations as well as the discipline of anthropology itself, they may also be establishing first claim in the new academic territory on which this decade's battles for intellectual supremacy and jobs will be waged. particular historical and cultural world."42 In thus constructing himself as just one more "other" among the rest, Rabinow risks the danger he ascribes to critics like James Clifford: "obliterating meaningful difference," obliterating and obscuring some of the privileges and power granted to him by race, nationality, and gender.43 He describes his decision to study elite French male colonial officials as proceeding from this oppositional ethical stance: "By 'studying up' I find myself in a more comfortable position than I would be were I 'giving voice' on behalf of dominated or marginal groups." An exclusive focus on the elite, eschewing the dominated or marginal, is a dangerous, if comfortable, correction. Feminists have taught us the danger of analyses that focus exclusively on men: they have traditionally rendered gender differences irrelevant and reinforced the Western male as the norm. Rabinow's earlier Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco relied exclusively on male informants, presenting women only marginally and as objects of his sexual desire, communicating through "the unambiguity of gesture."44 Ironically, he claims his new work will broaden "considerations of power and representation" which were "too localized in my earlier work on Morocco," yet he focuses even more explicitly on men. This can be defended only if Rabinow struggles with his earlier insensitivity to gender issues and, in this study of elite powerful males, undertakes that part of the feminist project particularly suited to male practitioners: deconstructing the patriarchy.45
Feminists' call for self-reflexivity in men is related to postmodernist anthropology's goal of self-critique; when anthropologists include themselves as characters in ethnographic texts instead of posing as objective controlling narrators, they expose their biases. This coincides with the goals of postmodernism as characterized by Jane Flax: "Postmodern discourses are all 'deconstructive' in that they seek to distance us from and make us skeptical about beliefs Strathern thus suggests that there can be no true merging of feminism and the new ethnography, but this contention is based on a problematic formulation. Even the brief quotations above indicate Strathern's disturbing use of the term "other" to refer to "'patriarchy,' the institutions and persons who represent male domination, often simply concretized as 'men.' " This, she believes, is the "other" of feminism, the "other" that feminists must remain in opposition to for "the construction of the feminist self."49 This feminist need to remain distinct from a wrongheaded male "other" is at odds, she argues, with the new ethnography's desire to get close to and know the "other." But in this latter usage of the word "other," she refers to the traditional anthropological subject of study, non-Western peoples. In her awkward parallel usage, Strath- Strathern suggests, wrongly attributing this insight to the oppositional position feminists strike in relation to the patriarchal "other."50 Our suspicion of the new ethnographers' desire for collaboration with the "other" stems not from any such refusal to enter into dialogue with that "other," but from our history and understanding of being appropriated and literally spoken for by the dominant, and from our consequent sympathetic identification with the subjects of anthropological study in this regard. This leads to the questioning, voiced recently by Judith Stacey, of whether any ethnography of the "other" can be compatible with feminist politics. Stacey argues that despite the appearance of compatibility between feminist researchers seeking an "egalitarian research process characterized by authenticity, reciprocity, and intersubjectivity between the researcher and her 'subjects,' " and the face-to-face and personalized encounter of the ethnographic field experience, major contradictions exist. First, the highly personalized relationship between ethnographer and research subject, which masks actual differences in power, knowledge, and structural mobility, "places research subjects at grave risk of manipulation and betrayal by the ethnographer." Additionally, Stacey points to the contradiction between the desire for collaboration on the final research product and the fact that "the research product is ultimately that of the researcher, however modified or influenced by informants."51 Stacey's response to these contradictions is to despair of a fully feminist ethnography. "There can be ethnographies that are partially feminist, accounts of culture enhanced by the application of feminist perspectives," she argues, and there can be "feminist research that is rigorously self-aware and therefore humble about the partiality of its ethnographic vision and its capacity to represent self and other."52 But how are these goals to be realized? Has feminism nothing more to teach the new ethnography? We have suggested that an important aspect of feminist scholarship is its relationship to a politics. Strathern notes that within feminist writing, "play with context [similar to that used by the new ethnographers] is creative because of the expressed continuity of purpose between feminists as scholars and feminists as activists."53 Feminism teaches us to take up a particularly moral and sensitive attitude toward relationships by emphasizing the importance of community building to the feminist project, and it also demands scrutiny of our motivations for research. In their current experimentation, anthropologists need a renewed sensitivity to "the question of relationships involved in communication."54 They need to learn the lessons of feminism and consider for whom they write.
Throughout her discussion of postmodernist anthropology, Strathern displays suspicions, like those that feminists have, of its claims to use free play and jumble, to present many voices in flattened, nonhierarchical, plural texts, to employ "heteroglossia (a utopia of plural endeavour that gives all collaborators the status of authors)." Irony, she argues, rather than jumble is the postmodern mode, and "irony involves not a scrambling but a deliberate juxtaposition of contexts, pastiche perhaps but not jumble."5 Strathern contrasts this illusion of free play in postmodernist anthropology with feminist writing: "Much feminist discourse is constructed in a plural way. Arguments are juxtaposed, many voices solicited....
There are no central texts, no definitive techniques." Unlike postmodern writing, however, which masks its structuring oppositions under a myth of jumble, feminist scholarship has "a special set of social interests. Feminists argue with one another in their many voices because they also know themselves as an interest group."56 Thus, although feminism originally may have discovered itself by becoming conscious of oppression, more recently feminists have focused on relations among women and the project of conceiving difference without binary opposition. Feminist politics provide an explicit structure that frames our research questions and moderates the interactions in which we engage with other women. Where there is no such explicit political structure, the danger of veiled agendas is great.
Anthropologists could benefit from an understanding of this feminist dialogue. Just as early feminist theory of the "other" is grounded in women's actual subordination to men, so more recent , that pro-choice legislation has provided a rationale for forced sterilization and abortions among the poor and women of color, and that feminist-backed no-fault-divorce legislation has contributed to the feminization of poverty. The new ethnography draws on postmodernist epistemology to accomplish its political ends, but much feminism derives its theory from a practice based in the material conditions of women's lives. Both postmodernist anthropology and feminism assume a selfconsciously reflexive stance toward their subjects, but there are significant differences between them. For, as Sandra Harding has suggested, at the moment that feminist scholars begin to address themselves to women's experiences, their inquiry necessarily becomes concerned with questions of power and political struggle, and their research goals become defined by that struggle. This is because "the questions an oppressed group wants answered are rarely requests for so-called pure truth. Instead, they are questions about how to change its conditions; how its world is shaped by forces beyond it; how to win over, defeat or neutralize those forces arrayed against its emancipation, growth or development; and so forth."58 The feminist researcher is led to design projects that, according to Harding, women want and need.
Indeed, in this sense, feminist research is more closely aligned with applied anthropology, whose practitioners also often derive that twentieth-century "natives" may themselves be in need of therapy, "neutered, like the rest of us, by the dark forces of the world system."6 Yet the romantic tradition in anthropology is being sustained by the postmodernist mandate for self-reflection. For in turning inward, making himself, his motives, and his experience the thing to be confronted, the postmodernist anthropologist locates the "other" in himself. It is as if, finding the "exotic" closed off to him, the anthropologist constructs himself as the exotic.6 This is clearly the case, for example, in The Princes of Naranja.67 Here, Paul Friedrich's characterization of the salient features of his own life history connects in the reader's mind with images of the Tarascan princes who have appeared on earlier pages: home-bred fatalism, peer rivalry, and personal experiences with death and danger. Since Friedrich's self-reflection was written some thirty years after his initial fieldwork experience in Naranja, it seems likely, although Friedrich does not suggest it, that this inscription of his own childhood history may have been as much affected by his Naranja experience as vice versa. Ironically, Friedrich's book, which opens up the possibility of demystifying the "other," reveals that this process may lead to a mystification of the self. In this light, it is hardly surprising that Clifford's work is so popular. Clifford the historian has turned ethnographers into the natives to be understood and ethnography into virgin territory to be explored.
This current focus on self-reflexivity in postmodernist anthropology is expressed not only in works that make the ethnographer into a character in the ethnographic text but also in analyses of earlier ethnographic writing.6 Of this process Marilyn Strathern comments, "Retrospectively to ask about the persuasive fictions of earlier epochs is to ask about how others (Frazer, Malinowski, and the rest) handled our moral problems of literary construction. In answering the question, we create historic shifts between past writers in terms persuasive to our own ears, thereby participating in a postmodern history, reading back into books the strategies of fictionalisation. To construct past works as quasi-intentional literary games is the new ethnocentrism. There is no evidence, after all, that 'we' have stopped attributing our problems to 'others.' "69 Furthermore, much of this historical analysis deals with colonialism, affording the contemporary anthropologist a field of study in which it is possible to hold a critical and ethical view. Paradoxically, however, it simultaneously replays a time in which Western white males were of supreme importance in the lives of the "other" just at this moment when the anthropologist fears his irrelevance.
Such paradoxes, which emerge from the wedding of postmodernism with anthropology, pose the most difficult questions for practitioners of the new ethnography at present: once one articulates an epistemology of free play in which there is no inevitable relationship between signifier and signified, how is it possible to write an ethnography that has descriptive force? Once one has no metanarratives into which the experience of difference can be translated, how is it possible to write any ethnography? Here, too, lessons from feminism may be helpful; since current feminist theory lives constantly with the paradoxical nature of its own endeavor, it offers postmodernism models for dealing with contradiction. As Nancy Cott suggests, feminism is paradoxical in that it "aims for individual freedoms by mobilizing sex solidarity. It acknowledges diversity among women while positing that women recognize their unity. It requires gender consciousness for its basis, yet calls for the elimination of prescribed gender roles." Postmodern thought has helped feminists to argue that women's inferior status is a product of cultural and historical constructions and to resist essentialist truth claims, but the danger for feminists is that "in deconstructing categories of meaning, we deconstruct not only patriarchal definitions of 'womanhood' and 'truth' but also the very categories of our own analysis-'women' and 'feminism' and 'oppression.' "70
That feminist theory, with its recent emphasis on the diversity of women's experience, has not succumbed entirely to the seduction of postmodernism and the dangers inherent in a complete decentering of the historical and material is due in part to feminist theory's concern with women as the central category of analysis and with feminism's political goal of changing the power relationships that underlie women's oppression. Feminists will not relinquish Hidden power relations constitute problems not only for women and for feminist scholarship but also for men and for the dominant discourse whose claims to objectivity are marred by distortions and mystification. The very fictional forms that in postmodern epistemology are the ideal vehicles for uncovering these power relations actually may tempt the new ethnographer to write without deciding who the audience is. The new ethnography must embed its theory in a grounded politics rather than turning to a currently popular aesthetic without interrogating the way in which that thinking is potentially subversive of anthropology's own political agenda.
It is true that postmodernism, with its emphasis on the decentering of the Cartesian subject, can be invigorating to those traditionally excluded from discourse. Jane Flax has stressed this liberating potential, arguing that postmodern experimentation encourages us "to tolerate and interpret ambivalence, ambiguity, and 71 Ibid. for a dialogue that is intertextual, not merely intratextual, since "it is clearly the case that the single dialogic text may express the attempt to recapture and thus neutralize, once more, the relation between us and them by assuming that the anthropologist can represent the other's voice."89 Stacey argues that "acknowledging partiality and taking responsibility for authorial construction" are not enough: "The postmodern strategy is an inadequate response to the ethical issues endemic to ethnographic process and product."90 The new ethnography threatens to subsume the "other" either in a manipulative, totalizing form whose politics is masked, or in the historically contingent discourse of each reader's response. In their borrowing of techniques from fiction, new ethnographers do not claim to write purely imaginative works. They continue to make some truth claims: their use of dialogue is presented as reflecting their experience in the field, and the fragmentation of their texts is presented as mirroring their postmodern condition. As Tyler puts it, "We confirm in our ethnographies our consciousness of the fragmentary nature of the post-modern world, for nothing so well defines our world as the absence of a synthesizing allegory."9' This is not true for non-Western males or for all women. The supposed absence of all metanarratives-the experience of helplessness and fragmentation-is the new synthesizing allegory that is being projected onto white women and Third World peoples who only recently have been partially empowered. To the extent that the new ethnography's political strength lies in a social criticism based on the "sophisticated reflection by the anthropologist about herself and her own society that describing an alien culture engenders," as Marcus and Fischer have suggested, it is disheartening as anthropology.9 It has lost its claim to describe the "other" and yet seems devoid of the capacity to empower anyone but the writer and the reader for whom it serves as academic collateral or therapy. Anthropology is potentially reduced to an identity ritual for the anthropologist. If the new ethnography is that, then it must be seen as a facet of postmodernism's ultimate defense of the privilege of the traditional subject, even as, paradoxically, it deconstructs subject status.
While postmodern thinking has indeed invigorated many academic disciplines, anthropology must reconsider the costs of embracing it. Those anthropologists sensitive to the power relations in the ethnographic enterprise who wish to discover ways of confronting them ethically would do better to turn to feminist theory and practice than to postmodernism. Ultimately, the postmodern focus on style and form, regardless of its sophistication, directs our attention away from the fact that ethnography is more than "writing it up." From women's position as "other" in a patriarchal culture and from feminists' dialogue and confrontation with diverse groups of women, we have learned to be suspicious of all attempts by members of a dominant group to speak for the oppressed, no matter how eloquently or experimentally. Politically sensitive anthropologists should not be satisfied with exposing power relations in the ethnographic text, if that is indeed what the new ethnography accomplishes, but rather should work to overcome these relations. By turning to postmodernism, they may instead be (unwittingly or not) reinforcing such power relations and preserving their status as anthropologists, as authoritative speakers. Anthropologists may be better able to overcome these power relations by framing research questions according to the desires of the oppressed group, by choosing to do work that "others" want and need, by being clear for whom they are writing, and by adopting a feminist political framework that is suspicious of relationships with "others" that do not include a close and honest scrutiny of the motivations for research. Within Western culture, women's position has been paradoxical. Like a Third World person who has been educated at Oxbridge, we feminist scholars speak at once as the socially constituted "other" and as speakers within the dominant discourse, never able to place ourselves wholly or uncritically in either position. Similarly, although ethnographers are speakers of the dominant discourse, they know the experience of otherness, albeit a self-inflicted and temporally limited one, from their time in the field. They may be able to draw on their experiences as outsiders in that situation to help them clarify their political and personal goals and to set their research agendas. While it is complex and uncomfortable to speak from a position that is neither inside nor outside, it is this position that necessitates that we merge our scholarship with a clear politics to work against the forces of oppression. 
